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W e examine inventory decisions in a multiperiod newsvendor model. In particular, we analyze the impact of budgetcycles in a behavioral setting. We derive optimal rational decisions and characterize the behavioral decision-making
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jects reduce order-up-to levels significantly at the end of the current budget cycle, which results in a cyclic pattern during
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up-to levels increase in the starting inventory.
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1. Introduction
Managing inventories to align supply with demand is
critical for the financial performance of many firms
(Eroglu and Hofer 2011, Hendricks and Singhal 2009,
Steinker and Hoberg 2013). Most products are sold
over multiple periods and can be replenished in regu-
lar intervals. Even though in many cases replenish-
ment systems are automated, inventory managers
still monitor stock levels over time, observe fluctuat-
ing demand, and place or adjust orders with suppliers
as required. Therefore, the human effect is a crucial
part of such replenishment systems (Bendoly et al.
2010, Boudreau et al. 2003, Gino and Pisano 2008).
Inventory managers typically face performance
evaluations on a regular basis, e.g., based on monthly,
quarterly, or yearly budget cycles. The most common
budget cycle is the fiscal year, and firms generally aim
to demonstrate higher performance toward the end of
the fiscal year. This also holds for inventories, because
investors have recently been found to pay particular
attention to inventory metrics (Gaur et al. 2005, Kesa-
van et al. 2010), which can reveal important informa-
tion about operational efficiency (Monga 2012) and
future financial performance (Kesavan and Mani
2013). Prior literature has also shown that firms often
engage in real earnings manipulation towards the fis-
cal-year end to demonstrate better performance to the
stock market (Roychowdhury 2006). In an inventory-
specific context, Lai (2008) found that retailers reduce
inventories on average by 10% in the fourth fiscal
quarter, even after correcting for sales timing. Hoberg
et al. (2017) extended this analysis to manufacturing
firms, which reduce inventories on average by 6% at
the end of the fiscal year. These strong inventory
reductions could serve as signals of efficiency.
Accordingly, an inventory manager who receives a
bonus based on performance within the current budget
cycle may have the incentive to optimize inventories
toward the end of that cycle. Human decision makers
may thus be short-sighted and focus only on decisions
and bonuses pertaining to the current budget cycle,
mentally discounting future bonuses because they are
temporally distant. Moreover, in some cases human
planners will no longer be responsible for a given task
This is an open access article under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits
use, distribution and reproduction in any medium,
provided the original work is properly cited.
Please Cite this article in press as: Becker-Peth, M. et al. Multiperiod Inventory Management with Budget Cycles: Rational and Behav-
ioral Decision-Making. Production and Operations Management (2019), https://doi.org/10.1111/poms.13123
Vol. 0, No. 0, xxxx–xxxx 2019, pp. 1–21 DOI 10.1111/poms.13123
ISSN 1059-1478|EISSN 1937-5956|19|00|0001 © 2019 The Authors. Production and Operations Management published by
Wiley Periodicals, Inc. on behalf of Production and Operations Management Society
in the following budget cycle, e.g., due to job changes.
Therefore, it is possible that limited planning horizons
and short-sightedness result in the evaluation of these
repeated incentives as single-period incentives.
In this study, we analyze the effect of the budget
cycle in a multiperiod inventory setting. Figure 1 out-
lines our stylized setting. A human decision maker is
responsible for making inventory decisions over JN
periods. This relates to J budget cycles with each bud-
get cycle consisting of N periods. In each period, a
replenishment order is placed, demand is observed,
and inventories are carried over to the next period.
However, the human decision maker does not receive
a formal incentive to optimize inventories in view of
the budget cycle. She is incentivized by the total cash
flow generated over all JN periods. Using laboratory
experiments, we explicitly analyze behavioral aspects
in this multiperiod inventory management setting.
Many behavioral studies have explored the impact of
human behavior on inventory management using a
single-period model (for an overview of behavioral
inventory management studies see, e.g., Becker-Peth
and Thonemann 2018).
The classic newsvendor setting typically serves as a
basis for this stream of literature. From the perspective
of financial performance metrics, the newsvendor
model relates to a classic cash flow incentive: the deci-
sion maker faces random demand and has to deter-
mine the optimal inventory level to balance leftover
inventory and lost sales at the end of the period.
Remaining inventory is carried over from one period
to the next. However, little is known about human
behavior when the newsvendor model is extended to
the multiperiod case, that is, to a setting in which start-
ing inventory is present at the beginning of a period,
the decision maker faces multiple periods with stochas-
tic demand, and she has to make multiple order deci-
sions. In addition, researchers have not investigated
whether the framing of budget cycles does in fact affect
the order decisions. Rationally, this should not be the
case, because all bonuses in our setting simply accumu-
late over time and are not discounted in any way.
Against this background, the objective of our study
is to investigate the factors that affect human deci-
sions in multiperiod decision-making. In particular,
we examine how human planners react to starting
inventories that are carried over from one period to
another. Next, we investigate the impact of budget
cycles and analyze the extent to which human deci-
sion makers adjust their ordering decisions during
the budget cycle. Specifically, we derive the optimal
order-up-to level to understand the decision of a fully
rational decision maker. Next, we conduct a lab
experiment to test the rational predictions and disen-
tangle three behavioral factors that become relevant
in our setting. We find that normatively irrelevant
budget cycles have a significant impact on actual
ordering behavior because decision makers focus too
much on the current cycle and under-weight the
effects on future cycles.
Our research is closely related to two streams of
research: (i) behavioral operations management, and
(ii) finite-horizon inventory models. The research on be-
havioral operations management provides one of the foun-
dations of our paper. Behavioral research in general
challenges the main underlying assumption of most
operation management models: fully rational profit
maximization by the decision maker. Deviations from
this assumption can be categorized into two dimen-
sions. The first is the use of an alternative utility func-
tion, including risk and loss aversion (Abdellaoui et al.
2007, Tversky and Kahneman 1991) or preferences in
addition to or different from the absolute monetary
payoff, e.g., stock-out aversion. The second dimension
is the inability to maximize the utility function: This
includes decision heuristics (Tversky and Kahneman
1974) and bounded rationality (Simon 1955).
Starting with Schweitzer and Cachon (2000), recent
contributions to the literature have considered actual
stocking decisions in the newsvendor setting using
laboratory experiments. Testing different theories,
these studies have provided evidence for various
decision biases that are partly general and partly con-
text dependent. The most striking observation, which
is consistent across nearly all follow-up studies, is the
so-called pull-to-center effect. In the classical
newsvendor problem, optimal stocking quantities are
above mean demand for high profit margins and
below mean demand for low profit margins—the crit-
ical fractile solution (Arrow et al. 1951). In laboratory
experiments, human decision makers actually order
more (less) than mean demand in high- (low-) margin
Budget cycle 1
Period 1 … Period N
Budget cycle 2 … Budget cycle J
Period 1 … Period N Period 1 … Period N Period 1 … Period N
……
Planning horizon of manager
Figure 1 Multiperiod Setting with Budget Cycles
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settings, but they significantly deviate from the opti-
mal order quantities. The adjustment upward (down-
ward) from mean demand to the optimal order
quantities is insufficient; the order quantities are
between mean demand and the optimal quantities—
they are pulled to center (Schweitzer and Cachon
2000). This effect decreases little over time (Bolton and
Katok 2008), and students as well as managers exhibit
this decision bias in the lab (Bolton et al. 2012).
Based on this observation, explanations such as risk
and loss aversion/seeking have been ruled out as
(stand-alone) explanations for the decision biases,
because such preferences would lead to similar devia-
tions in the high- and low-profit cases, e.g., risk- or
loss-averse decision makers would order less in both
cases (Becker-Peth et al. 2018, Eeckhoudt et al. 1995,
de Vericourt et al. 2013, Wang and Webster 2009
analyze how risk preferences affect human newsven-
dors in more detai). To explain the observed ordering
pattern, various theories have been tested, including
bounded rationality (Su 2008), mean anchoring (Sch-
weitzer and Cachon 2000), prospect theory (Long and
Nasiry 2014), and ex-post inventory error minimiza-
tion (Ho et al. 2010, Kremer et al. 2014). Although the
literature has found support for each of their explana-
tions, the trade-off between these theories has yet to
be analyzed sufficiently. Other studies have analyzed
context-specific decision biases. Katok and Wu (2009)
found significant differences in ordering behavior
between equivalent buyback and revenue-sharing
contracts. Becker-Peth et al. (2013) found specific
mental accounting effects (Thaler 1999) in the buy-
back contract, and Kremer et al. (2010) found a stron-
ger anchoring on mean demand in the newsvendor
setting compared to an equivalent lottery choice task.
In contrast to our paper, this stream of the literature
has focused on the single-period newsvendor setting
without inventory carryover.
In the domain of multiperiod inventory settings, a
stream of research has investigated the well-known
beer game, which is a multistage inventory system
(e.g., Croson and Donohue 2006, Croson et al. 2014,
Sterman 1989). These studies have described the
bullwhip effect, which can be attributed to both
structural deficits of the system and behavioral fac-
tors, e.g., decision makers’ practice of under-weight-
ing the supply line. Our setting differs substantially
from this one. First, we do not consider backlogs but
use a lost sales system. Second, we abstract from
lead times, so there is no supply line that could be
under-weighted. Additionally, the literature on the
beer game setting has focused strongly on demand
variability amplification across multiple players and
has paid less attention to the multiperiod inventory
decision-making of individuals, which is the focus of
our paper.
Other studies of multiperiod inventory decisions
include Hartwig et al. (2015), who analyzed strategic
inventories in a two-period setting but with determin-
istic demand. The newsvendor model with transship-
ments (for theoretical studies see, e.g., Dong and Rudi
2004, Sosic 2006 has been developed by a stream of lit-
erature that is based on the two-period newsvendor
model. However, in that setting, the second decision
is not an ordering decision under uncertainty but
rather a filling up/selling decision with deterministic
quantities, and little work has examined the behav-
ioral aspects of decision makers in this setting.
Using a setting rather similar to ours, Katok et al.
(2008) examined a multiperiod setting under a service
level agreement, but they focused on the effect of the
review periods and the size of the service level bonus
rather than on differences of actual order decisions
between periods. Additionally, they used the order-
up-to level as the decision variable, whereas we use
order quantities (the details of our setting are
described below).
In terms of the psychological literature, decision-
making in our setting is related to choice bracketing,
which is defined as “the grouping of individual
choices together into sets” (Read et al. 1999, p. 172).
When decision makers act in a budget cycle environ-
ment, they may be affected by the cyclic frame. Kah-
neman and Lovallo (1993) argued that “people tend
to make decisions one at a time, and [. . .] they are
prone to neglect the relevance of future decision
opportunities” (Kahneman and Lovallo 1993, p. 23).
Similarly, Rabin and Weizs€acker (2009) argued that “a
decision maker who faces multiple decisions tends to
choose an option in each case without full regard to
the other decisions and circumstances that she faces”
(Rabin and Weizs€acker 2009, p. 1508). Regarding
financial investments, Benartzi and Thaler (1995)
related this effect to differences between evaluation
periods and planning periods. Investments for a pen-
sion plan (with a planning horizon of 30 years or
more) are affected by the yearly evaluation reports,
e.g., those provided by the insurance companies. This
results in actions of decision makers that optimize
their investment plan for the upcoming year (evalua-
tion period) while under-weighting the long-term
effects (planning horizon) (Benartzi and Thaler 1995).
Although the terms used in the papers differ (e.g.,
narrow frames or isolated choices in Herrnstein and
Prelec 1992, Kahneman and Lovallo 1993), all the
terms refer to the effect of choices being “made with
an eye to the local consequences of one or few
choices” (Read et al. 1999, p. 172, calling it narrow
bracketing). Having a budget cycle frame in the
experiment, we expect similar effects to be present in
the setting. In this study, we refer to this effect as
short-sightedness.
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In light of the aforementioned literature, our study
makes a threefold contribution. First, we analyze the
effect of the cash flow incentive on inventory deci-
sions in a multiperiod (finite horizon) setting and
determine that optimal order-up-to levels decrease
towards the end of the planing horizon. Second, we
find that starting inventory plays an important role
when human subjects decide on order quantities. Sub-
jects seem to under-weight the available starting
inventory when making their ordering decisions. We
find that a unit of starting inventory increases the
order-up-to level by 0.324 units. Third, we analyze
how budget cycles affect decision-making in the mul-
tiperiod setting. We find that order-up-to levels fol-
low a cyclic pattern over time: orders are higher in the
early periods and lower in the later periods of a bud-
get cycle. This is driven by short-sighted behavior,
because human decision makers focus on the current
budget cycle and disregard future periods. We test
different lengths of budget cycles and different frames
and find consistent short-sightedness in ordering
behavior in all settings.
The remainder of the study is structured as follows.
In section 2, we formulate mathematical models for
rational and behavioral decision-making. In section 3,
we analyze behavioral decision-making based on sin-
gle-period and multiperiod laboratory experiments.
In section 4, we conclude and discuss our findings.
All proofs can be found in the Appendix.
2. Decision-Making
In this section, we formulate the mathematical model
for the classic cash flow incentive scheme. The cash
flow incentive is used to analyze both rational and
behavioral decision-making. We then describe the
sequence of events and derive the rational single-per-
iod model (section 2.1), which serves as a building
block for the rational multiperiod model (section 2.2)
and the behavioral multiperiod model that we
develop subsequently (section 2.3). Products are non-
perishable and have an infinite horizon. However,
managers are typically held accountable for their per-
formance over the budget cycle, which is a finite hori-
zon (Thomas 2005). In our single-period model, the
manager has to make decisions for only one period of
the infinite horizon. Analogously, in the two-period
model, the manager has to make decisions for two
consecutive periods of the infinite horizon. Finally, in
the multiperiod model, the manager has to make deci-
sions for multiple budget cycles with two periods
each. Accordingly, we assume a finite incentive hori-
zon, which is in line with the short-term incentive
structures in place in many companies that have
incentives linked to specific time intervals, e.g., a
month, quarter, or year.
2.1. Rational Single-Period Model
The manager operates under an order-up-to level
policy according to which she brings the inventory
level to S at the beginning of the single period. The
customer demand ξ is stochastic, with p.d.f. f(ξ) and
c.d.f. F(ξ). The unit sales price is r, and the unit pur-
chase cost is c. Excess inventory at the end of the
period incurs a unit holding cost h that reflects the
physical inventory holding fee charged by a logis-
tics service provider. Our model assumes lost sales;
that is, unfulfilled demand does not carry over to
the next period but is lost. Motivated by the work
of Zipkin (2008) and Bharadwaj et al. (2002), we
focus on a lost sales problem. More specifically,
Bharadwaj et al. (2002) showed that only 15% of
consumers will delay their purchase in the event of
a stock-out. Our model assumes no unit shortage
costs for lost sales.
In our paper, the manager makes inventory deci-
sions under a cash flow incentive. The objective func-
tion for the cash flow incentive includes the revenue
from sales, the purchasing cost for all products pur-
chased, and the holding cost. The cash flow is defined
as
CFðSÞ ¼ rðS; nÞ  cS hð0; S nÞþ; ð1Þ
where S is the order-up-to level. We use the follow-
ing notation: ða; bÞ ¼ minða; bÞ and ða; bÞþ ¼
maxða; bÞ. Therefore, ðS; nÞ is the sales quantity
(minimum of order-up-to level and demand), and
ð0; S nÞþ is the excess inventory at the end of the
period.
Note that the cash flow is directly affected by units
bought but not sold in the period. Furthermore, we
assume that the initial inventory is zero, while the
model can be easily adjusted otherwise. The expected
objective function for the single-period cash flow
incentive is shown in Equation (2).
max
S
E½CFðSÞ
¼ max
S
"
r
Z 1
S
SfðnÞdnþ r
Z S
0
nf nð Þdn
 cS h
Z S
0
ðS nÞfðnÞdn
#
:
ð2Þ
In the analytical model and for simplicity of pre-
sentation, we assume that the demand follows a con-
tinuous uniform distribution U[0,1]. If demand
follows a continuous uniform distribution U[0,1],
then we can easily show that the optimal order-up-to
level is S ¼ rcrþh. Note that for the numerical analy-
ses, we use a continuous uniform distribution U
[0,100], because it intuitively relates to the laboratory
setting.
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2.2. Rational Multiperiod Model
In this section, we extend our single-period model to
a multiperiod inventory decision problem, in which
the manager operates under an order-up-to level pol-
icy according to which she observes the initial inven-
tory level xt at the beginning of period t and brings it
to level St if St [ xt by placing an order
qt ¼ ð0; St  xtÞþ. If the optimal cash flow profit from
period t onwards is now denoted as cCFtðxt; StÞ, then
we can use the following recursive expression:
cCFtðxt; StÞ ¼ max
St
"
r
Z 1
xtþqt
ðxt þ qtÞfðntÞdnt
þ r
Z xtþqt
0
ntf ntð Þdnt  cqt
 h
Z xtþqt
0
ðxt þ qt  ntÞf ntð Þdnt
þ cCFtþ1ðxtþ1; Stþ1Þ#;
ð3Þ
where xtþ1 ¼ ð0; xt þ qt  ntÞþ. See Zipkin (2000,
2008) for a detailed discussion of the recursive equa-
tions and standard transformations for the lost sales
problem. For the multiperiod model, a closed form
solution is not possible. Zipkin (2000, 2008) pro-
vided a detailed discussion of solution techniques
and heuristics based on state reduction for lost sales
models. We can derive a closed form solution for
the special case of two periods.
PROPOSITION 1. For a two-period model, the optimal
order-up-to level for the first decision
S1 ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
r2 þ 2hrþ h22chc2
p
h
rþh is higher than that for the sec-
ond decision S2 ¼ rcrþh (which is equivalent to the single-
period decision).
Figure 2 illustrates the numerical optimal order-up-
to levels for different horizon lengths (N = 1,2,4, and
8). For this analysis, we use r = 20, c = 7.5, and h = 5.
Figure 2 shows that the optimal order-up-to level
gradually decreases for the last two decisions (SN and
SN1). The intuition behind this decrease is that the
overage costs are higher for these periods, because
there are no further opportunities to sell leftover
products in later periods.
COROLLARY 1. For a multiperiod model, the optimal
order-up-to levels of the last two periods are equivalent to
the two-period model.
It is also evident that the order-up-to level increases
once more for earlier decisions (for SN2; SN3; . . . for
N = 4 and N = 8) but then stays constant at the high
level. More specifically, the order-up-to levels
SN2; SN3; . . . approach the level of the infinite hori-
zon model. Having an infinite horizon, the optimal
order-up-to level (base stock policy) is (Porteus 1990)
Sinf ¼
r c
r cþ h : ð4Þ
For the numerical example in Figure 2, the optimal
order-up-to level is Sinf ¼ 71:4. We conclude that
the end-of-horizon effect is relevant only for the last
(two) decisions in our setting.
2.3. Behavioral (Short-Sighted) Multiperiod Model
The previous section analyzed rational decision-mak-
ing in the context of a multiperiod inventory setting.
Following the classical operations management
approach, we optimized our decision model and
derived normative predictions for the optimal inven-
tory decision for our setting. Our solution can be
implemented into computerized optimization proto-
cols. In practical settings, human decision makers
often do not make inventory decisions according to
the optimization models.
The growing field of behavioral operations manage-
ment addresses this issue and incorporates human
decision-making into operations management mod-
els. In this section, we follow this research stream and
analyze our setting from a behavioral perspective.
Further, challenging the assumption of fully rational
expected-profit-maximizing decision makers, we dis-
cuss which behavioral aspects may affect inventory
decisions in our setting.
Numerous studies have analyzed actual human
decision-making in the context of inventory decisions
(see Becker-Peth and Thonemann 2018, for a compre-
hensive overview of existing behavioral newsvendor
literature). Focusing mainly on the single-period
newsvendor, the consistent observation is that human
decision makers do not order according to expected-
profit-maximizing predictions. The reasons for this
are manifold and include bounded rationality and
alternative preferences.
Regarding human decision makers in realistic set-
tings that involve multiperiod inventory decisions,
there is a crucially important observation that should
be captured in a decision model.
Many incentive systems for real-world managers
focus on the performance during a budget cycle, e.g.,
the year-end bonus of a decision maker is based on
the annual cash flow achieved within that year. Con-
sider, for example, a product/inventory manager
who has to place monthly orders for a certain (non-
perishable) product. At the end of the year, she will
receive a bonus based on her yearly performance, e.g.,
the cash flow achieved with her product.1
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Rationally, such a cyclical incentive structure
should not affect decision-making. Fully anticipating
the effect of current decisions on overall/future per-
formance, decision makers should act according to
the model described in the previous setting, even
under such budget-cycle-bonus contracts. However,
two factors may lead to deviations from the predic-
tion of the previous section.
First, decision makers receiving the bonus at the
end of the budget cycle may discount the future pay-
ments with a certain discount factor a; that is, future
money is less valuable than recent money. This kind
of modeling is also related to the financial literature
on discounting future income (Brealey et al. 2006,
Federgruen and Zipkin 1986). In the yearly payment
example mentioned above, payments of future years
are discounted, e.g., due to interest rates. In the lab
experiment we consider, such delayed payments are
not relevant, because there is no real time difference
and no discounting.
However, a (second) behavioral bias affects deci-
sion-making in a very similar way, and we expect it to
hold in the lab setting. Decision makers focusing on
the recent budget cycle may under-weight the effect
of the current cycle’s decisions on the following cycle.
In our setting, reframing a decision task of 16 inven-
tory decisions as 8 times 2 decisions (i.e., eight years
with two decisions per year) can be seen as an exam-
ple of inducing a narrow frame (Kahneman and
Lovallo 1993); see the introduction for a more detailed
description. Although decision makers are aware that
they are making 16 decisions, the budget cycle frame
may prevent them from fully considering the effects
of the current decision on decisions in later years. We
refer to this behavior as short-sightedness: decision
makers do not take all future effects into considera-
tion when making an ordering decision.
Please note that products (and the company) may
have an infinite planning horizon. However, the plan-
ning horizon for real-world managers (and for the
subjects in our lab experiments) is usually finite (e.g.,
due to job rotation or fixed-term employment con-
tracts). Therefore, it is appropriate to assume a finite
horizon. However, if we assume an infinite horizon,
the behavioral effects remain essentially the same (ex-
cept for the last two periods).
Consider that there are N decisions per budget
cycle, e.g., 12 monthly decisions, and the bonus is
paid only at the end of the year; then, the total yearly
cash flow consists of the sum of the monthly cash
flows of that year. Technically, we model the short-
sighted behavior as follows: decision makers discount
all future-year profits when making decisions in a cer-
tain budget cycle (e.g., decisions in periods t = 1,. . .,N
are in the first budget cycle, decisions in periods
t = N + 1,. . .,2N are in the second budget cycle, etc.).
Given this notation, the budget cycle is then defined
as j ¼ dt1N e, where j = 1 is the first budget cycle, etc.
Therefore, if we are currently in period t, which
belongs to the jth budget cycle, then we define the cash
flow from period t onwards gCFt as seen in the follow-
ing equation, where CFt is the actual cash flows as
defined above (note that we have suppressed the
notation ðxt; StÞ for the sake of simplicity).
gCFt ¼XjNt
k¼0
CFtþk þ a
XTt
k¼jNtþ1
CFtþk ð5Þ
The first sum represents all the remaining decisions
to be made within the current budget cycle, whereas
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Figure 2 Optimal Order-Up-To Levels
Becker-Peth, Hoberg, and Protopappa-Sieke: Multiperiod Inventory Management with Budget Cycles
6
Production and Operations Management 0(0), pp. 1–21, © 2019 The Authors. Production and Operations Management published by
Wiley Periodicals, Inc. on behalf of Production and Operations Management Society
Please Cite this article in press as: Becker-Peth, M. et al. Multiperiod Inventory Management with Budget Cycles: Rational and Behav-
ioral Decision-Making. Production and Operations Management (2019), https://doi.org/10.1111/poms.13123
the second sum includes all remaining decisions to be
made within the subsequent budget cycles until the
end of the time horizon, where T is the total number
of decisions to be made (having J budget cycles, we
have JN = T periods/decisions). We formulate our
model in this way (one discount factor for all deci-
sions in upcoming budget cycles) because this may
also be relevant in our experimental study. Techni-
cally, we solve the problem using backward induc-
tion, and we denote the optimal behavioral order-up-
to level that maximizes Equation (5) as Sat .
The analysis of the order-up-to levels shows a very
interesting pattern. Figure 3 illustrates the predicted
decisions for different discounting factors a for a set-
ting with two periods/decisions per budget cycle for
a horizon of eight budget cycles and for a setting with
four decisions per budget cycle for a horizon of four
years. Therefore, both settings have 16 decisions in
total. The gray bars illustrate the first decisions in
each budget cycle, whereas the white bars illustrate
the second decision in each budget cycle.
We first observe that the decisions in the last
budget cycle are equivalent for different values of
a because there is no future effect at all, so there is
no difference in future discounting. Essentially, the
order-up-to level for short-sighted decision makers
in the last budget cycle with N decisions per bud-
get cycle is equivalent to the rational N-period
decision model.
With respect to earlier budget cycles (j < J), we
observe that short-sightedness leads to a cyclic
decreasing pattern of the order-up-to levels
towards the end of the budget cycle. The last deci-
sion in a budget cycle SN decreases substantially
in a, and SN1 also decreases in a, but to a smaller
extent. For a = 0, the decisions for all budget
cycles are equivalent to the N-period decision
model (equivalent to Figure 2 with N = 2 repeat-
ing itself in each cycle), because the decision
maker acts as if the horizon ends after the current
budget cycle. For a = 1, the graph corresponds to
Figure 2 with N = 16.
Regarding the N = 4 setting, we see that SN2 and
SN3 are not affected by a (see also the normative
N = 4-period decision model in Figure 2). Addition-
ally, for a = 0, the graph corresponds to a repeated
Figure 2 with N = 4.
3. Experimental Design
Our setting differs from those of previous studies
because it is a multiperiod setting. This leads to two
main factors that may affect decision-making by
human subjects in the laboratory. First, for multi-
period products, inventory is carried over, yielding
starting inventory at the beginning of the next period.
This has not been addressed in previous behavioral
operations literature. Therefore, we design an
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
:
t t t
t t t
Figure 3 Optimal Order-Up-To Levels (numerical analysis) for Short-Sighted Decision Makers Focusing on Budget Cycles
Becker-Peth, Hoberg, and Protopappa-Sieke: Multiperiod Inventory Management with Budget Cycles
Production and Operations Management 0(0), pp. 1–21, © 2019 The Authors. Production and Operations Management published by
Wiley Periodicals, Inc. on behalf of Production and Operations Management Society 7
Please Cite this article in press as: Becker-Peth, M. et al. Multiperiod Inventory Management with Budget Cycles: Rational and Behav-
ioral Decision-Making. Production and Operations Management (2019), https://doi.org/10.1111/poms.13123
experiment to test whether starting inventory has an
effect on the order-up-to level. Second, we design an
experiment to test the aforementioned short-sighted
behavior in the multiperiod setting.
3.1. Study 1: Single-Period Model with Starting
Inventory
Most existing behavioral studies use settings without
starting inventory and ask the subjects to determine
order quantities explicitly. For these studies, the order
quantity equals the order-up-to level. However, for
our multiperiod model, the ending inventory from a
period is carried over to the next period and serves as
the starting inventory for the next period. Accord-
ingly, this will frequently violate the assumption of
no starting inventory.
In our setting, the optimal inventory policy is an
order-up-to policy. This is equivalent to an order
quantity policy whereby the starting inventory is
deducted from the optimal order-up-to level. Assum-
ing no starting inventory, the order quantity is equiv-
alent to the order-up-to level. To keep our
experiments similar to the existing literature, we use
the order quantity as the subject’s decision variable.
Therefore, decision makers have to account for possi-
ble nonzero starting inventory and deduct this from
their targeted order-up-to level. Rationally, the order-
up-to level should be the same for different starting
inventories as long as the starting inventory is below
the optimal order-up-to level. If the starting inventory
is above the optimal order-up-to level, decision mak-
ers should order zero units. In Study 1, we analyze
the effect of starting inventory on the order-up-to
level in the single-period model.
3.1.1. Laboratory Design. To analyze whether
starting inventory affects the order-up-to levels of
human decision makers, we conduct an experiment in
which the starting inventory is altered while the opti-
mal order-up-to level is held constant. To keep the
setting as simple as possible, we focus on a single-per-
iod model to analyze the effect of starting inventory.
The decision maker purchases products at a unit
purchasing cost c before the selling period. Demand is
discrete and uniformly distributed between 1 and
100. Similar discrete uniform demand distributions
are commonly used in experimental studies (e.g., Bol-
ton and Katok 2008, Bolton et al. 2012, Schweitzer and
Cachon 2000). If a product is sold, the decision maker
receives a unit revenue r. If a product is not sold, it is
stocked in inventory and induces a unit holding cost
h. In our experiment, we set r = 20, c = 7.5, and h = 5.
This results in an optimal order-up-to level of 50 units
in the single-period model. The reason for this choice
is to address the possible pull-to-center effect. Previ-
ous research has indicated that subjects anchor on
mean demand and that order quantities are pulled
towards mean demand (Bolton and Katok 2008, Bol-
ton et al. 2012, Schweitzer and Cachon 2000). With
our parameters, the optimal order-up-to level equals
the mean demand, and deviations from the optimal
order-up-to level therefore cannot be explained by
mean anchoring.
To keep our experiments similar to the existing
behavioral operations literature, the decision makers
are asked to determine order quantities. To test the
effect of starting inventory on the decisions, we varied
the starting inventory. We chose a starting inventory
of ISTART ¼ 0; 10; 20; 30; 40; 50; 60; 70 units. Starting
inventories smaller than or equal to the optimal
order-up-to level of 50 units are natural choices and
should lead to order quantities that result in an order-
up-to level of 50 units. For starting inventories equal
to or above 50 units, the optimal ordering quantity is
zero (recall that negative orders are not permitted).
We explicitly included these values to test the effect
of setting the starting inventory above the actual tar-
geted order-up-to level. This may also happen in the
multiperiod model if the optimal order quantity is
smaller in the upcoming period than in the previous
period and the actual demand in the previous period
is relatively small. Using a starting inventory of zero
allows us to calibrate the order-up-to levels to the
actual (non-affected) order-up-to level that the sub-
jects want to achieve.
Subjects faced each starting inventory twice, result-
ing in a total of 16 decisions. We randomized the
sequence of starting inventory levels to avoid order-
ing effects. The only exception was that we used one
of the ISTART ¼ 0 settings as the first round to have a
non-affected decision for this starting inventory. This
enables a better calibration of the decision makers’
targeted order-up-to level.
In our experiment, the decision task is more com-
plex than in the simple newsvendor setting. There-
fore, we provide decision support in the form of a bar
chart. This chart showed the actual starting inventory,
and the subjects could enter different possible order
quantities. The screen then stated the inventory level
after the order (i.e., the order-up-to level). The bar
chart also visualized this and displayed the expected
sales and resulting expected inventory level after
demand realization. This should have helped the
decision makers to evaluate the effect of their order
quantity on the expected revenues and the expected
inventory costs. The experiment was implemented in
Z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007); screenshots can be found
in the Online Appendix. After each round, demand
was realized and the subjects saw their actual perfor-
mance.
We conducted the experiments at the Cologne Lab-
oratory for Economic Research (CLER). We invited 14
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students via an online recruitment system (ORSEE);
all of them were master’s students with majors in
business administration or economics. At the begin-
ning of the experiment, students received written
instructions. The instructions explained the setting
and the decision task (instructions are contained in
the Online Appendix). After reading the instructions,
the subjects had to answer control questions about the
experiment. They could make as many attempts as
needed to answer the questions but could continue
with the experiment only after correctly answering all
questions. Having 16 decisions, subjects were paid
according to their average performance over all 16
rounds; that is, in the cash flow model, subjects were
paid based on the average cash flow achieved in the
experiment. Overall, the session lasted approximately
60 minutes, and the subjects earned an average of
around 15 euro.2
3.1.2. Experimental Results. To analyze the
inventory decisions of the subjects in the lab experi-
ments, we first calculate the actual order-up-to level
of the decision maker. Figure 4 shows the mean
order-up-to levels for the different starting invento-
ries. The horizontal line indicates the optimal order-
up-to levels given the starting inventory.
First, we observe that the order-up-to level is
below the optimal order-up-to level for most of the
starting inventories. For zero starting inventory, the
mean order-up-to level is only 37.7 units, which is
significantly different from the optimal level of 50
(p < 0.001). There are many possible reasons for
this. Risk and loss aversion are natural candidates
for an explanation, but over-weighting inventory
costs (e.g., leftover aversion) may also drive this
behavior.
Second, we observe that the order-up-to level
increases in the starting-inventory level. For example,
the mean order-up-to level for starting inventories of
50 units is 53.8 units, which is significantly greater
than the 37.7 for zero starting inventory (p = 0.001,
Wilcoxon signed-rank test). This effect may be driven
by the fact that the starting inventory is above the
actually targeted order-up-to level, and we need to
control for this effect. Adjusting the approach of Ster-
man (1989) and Croson and Donohue (2006) (who
estimate the under-weighting of pipeline inventory)
to the starting inventory in our setting, the order
quantity q of a subject is
q ¼ max 0; b0 þ b1ISTARTð Þ: ð6Þ
Adjusting this to the order-up-to level, we receive
Si ¼ max ISTART; b0 þ b01ISTART
 
; ð7Þ
where b01 relates to b1 from above with b
0
1 ¼ b1 þ 1.
The expected-profit-maximizing solution equals
b0 ¼ 50 and b01 ¼ 0. We estimate the parameters
individually for each subject using a bootstrapped
maximum-likelihood estimation with 100 replica-
tions per subject (each estimation contains N = 16
data points). Additionally, we perform a pooled
estimation (N = 224) with subject-specific clusters
(again bootstrapped with 100 replications). Table 1
presents the estimated parameters per subjected
and pooled. It shows that b01 is significantly > 0
for eight out of 14 subjects and b0 is significantly
smaller than 50 for 10 out of 14 subjects. Pooled,
the subjects under-weight the starting inventory by
0.324 (significantly > 0, p < 0.001) and have a
b0 ¼ 36:7.
For robustness, we conducted two additional analy-
ses. First, we consider only those rounds for which
the actual order quantity is > 0. Figure 5 shows the
mean order quantities for the different starting inven-
tories. We observe that the order quantities are not
sufficiently reduced to compensate for the increasing
starting inventories. Using the fixed-effect regression
q ¼ b0 þ b1ISTART shows that the coefficient for the
starting inventory is significantly > 1 (b1 ¼ 0:513
for nonzero orders, and b1 ¼ 0:675 for all orders if
ISTART  50, with p < 0.001 for both analyses).
Second, we consider the order-up-to level for the
decisions when starting inventory is zero and assume
that these settings show the unbiased order-up-to
level. For each subject, we exclude those periods
when the starting inventory is above the order-up-to
level of the zero-starting-inventory case. This
excludes all settings in which we expect subjects to
order zero units. The results are comparable to the
previous results, with b0 ¼ 37:58 (smaller than 50,
p < 0.01) and b01 ¼ 0:251 (> 0, p < 0.01).
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3.1.3. Endogenous Starting Inventory: The Two-
Period Case. In the experiment in Study 1, the start-
ing inventory was externally given by us. Because this
is rather artificial, we additionally conducted an
experiment with two consecutive decisions with
inventory carryover. This also serves as a robustness
check if the effect is still visible in a more complex set-
ting. Using the same cost parameters and demand
distribution as above, the second period of that setting
mimicked the previous experiment, with the differ-
ence that starting inventory was now a result of their
first order decision and random demand realization.
Subjects played eight rounds of these two decisions
(28 subjects participated in that experiment).3 The
normative predictions for that setting are visualized
in the second graph (N = 2) of Figure 2. We conduct
the same analyses as in Study 1 for the second (and
therefore last) decision per round. The results are
robust: subjects also under-weight the starting inven-
tory (b01 ¼ 0:124; p\ 0:001).
The results show that having higher starting invento-
ries increases order-up-to levels even when starting
inventories are below the optimal order-up-to level.
Previous studies have not analyzed this bias, because
they have not used multiperiod settings or starting
inventories. This result is very interesting and implies
that decision makers do not follow an order-up-to pol-
icy when they are asked to determine order quantities.
3.2. Study 2: Multiperiod Case
To examine a second behavioral aspect, we test
whether and how short-sightedness affects decision-
making in the context of multiperiod inventory deci-
sions. Based on our analysis in section 2.3, we design
an experiment which relates to the empirical setting
with budget cycles. Here we relate a budget cycle to a
year with two periods per year. Bonuses are awarded
annually, and total payout is calculated as the sum of
the annual cash flows.
3.2.1. Laboratory Design. The design of Study 2 is
related to the previous experiment. The decision
maker purchases products at a unit purchasing cost c
before the selling period. Demand is discrete and uni-
formly distributed between 1 and 100. If a product is
sold, the decision maker receives a unit revenue r. If a
product is not sold, it is stocked in inventory and
induces a unit holding cost h. Again, we use r = 20,
c = 7.5, and h = 5.
The main difference of Study 2 is that subjects
played 16 consecutive rounds; that is, the leftover
inventory of round t is the staring inventory of round
t + 1. Subjects made 16 decisions consecutively, see-
ing the demand realizations and leftover inventory of
the previous round. The subjects were paid according
to the overall cash flow obtained over all 16 decisions.
The rational expected-profit-maximizing order-up-
to levels therefore follow the pattern described in
Corollary 1. The left graph of Figure 3 shows the
rational predictions (a = 1) for our setting. Subjects
should have an order-up-to level of approx.
S1; . . .; S14 ¼ 71:4 for the first 14 decisions and then
decrease the order-up-to level to S15  68:8 and
S16 ¼ 50.
In total, we designed four treatments to test short-
sighted behavior in the lab, as shown in Table 2. In
Treatment 1, we display all 16 decisions on one
screen. Subjects place order quantities for a specific
round and see the resulting order-up-to level. After
that, the demand realizes and the inventory adapts
accordingly. After seeing this happen, subjects place a
Table 1 Estimation Results of Inventory Weighting Parameters
ID b0 p-value b
0
1 p-value ID b0 p-value b
0
1 p-value
1 30.1 0.000 0.429 0.274 8 40.0 0.000 0.000 0.999
2 27.6 0.000 0.529 0.000 9 39.8 0.044 0.293 0.038
3 54.8 0.061 0.380 0.000 10 34.8 0.000 0.393 0.000
4 44.0 0.164 0.414 0.007 11 19.1 0.000 0.696 0.000
5 43.0 0.031 0.050 0.782 12 45.0 0.481 2.000 0.262
6 43.0 0.207 0.050 0.930 13 36.5 0.000 0.271 0.008
7 36.5 0.001 0.331 0.017 14 43.5 0.207 0.150 0.581
Pooled 36.7 0.000 0.324 0.000
Note: Bootstrapped MLE with 100 replications each. Parameters significantly different from normative predictions (b0 ¼ 50;b01 ¼ 0) are in bold
(p < 0.1).
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new order quantity for the next round. After all 16
rounds are finalized, subjects see the final cash flow
and their resulting payout (instructions and screen-
shots for all treatments are presented in the Online
Appendix to visualize the design). This treatment
serves as a baseline treatment without any narrow
framing. We do not expect any short-sighted behavior
in T1. The left graph of Figure 6 shows the predictions
for T1.
In Treatments 2 and 3, we describe the setting as
eight years with two decisions (T2) or four years with
four decisions (T3). It was made clear that inventory
was carried over not only within but also across years.
However, subjects were told to make decisions per
year, and the screen contained only the decisions of
one respective year. After each year, subjects received a
notification with the obtained cash flow for the current
year (to represent budget cycles). Leftover inventory
was carried over between periods and years. However,
these budget cycles (years) do not affect rational deci-
sion-making. The payment was again based on the
total cash flow, which is the sum of the yearly cash
flows. On the other hand, if subjects are short-sighted,
they may be biased due to the yearly cycles.
For a robustness check, we added an alternative
(weaker) frame in T4. T4 was similar to T2, using
eight years with two decisions each (the instructions
also describe it as eight years with two decisions). To
emphasize the total set of 16 decisions, we visualized
all of them on one screen, separating the years only
with vertical lines and highlighting the yearly cash
flows (screenshot comparisons between T2 and T4 are
shown in the Appendix). We assume that this alterna-
tive frame may reduce the short-sightedness of the
decision makers, because the separation between the
years is much weaker on the screen.
The middle and right graphs of Figure 6 show the
behavioral predictions for short-sighted subjects for
T2, T3, and T4. We observe the effect described above:
order-up-to levels exhibit a cyclic structure in which
subjects decrease the order-up-to levels in the last
decision of a year. Note that order-up-to levels are
also slightly below rational quantities for the second-
last decision within a year. However, this effect is
rather small (and may also be superposed with mean
anchoring in our experimental data).
The experiments were again conducted at the
Cologne Laboratory for Economic Research (CLER),
and we recruited 112 students (business administra-
tion or economics) in total (T1: 28, T2: 29, T3: 28, T4:
27) via ORSEE. The session lasted approximately 75
minutes, and the subjects earned on average around
€19.
3.2.2. Experimental Results. We start with a
quick analysis of our baseline treatment (T1). For the
first 14 decisions, in which the optimal order-up-to
level is 71.4, the mean order-up-to level is 54.4
(p < 0.001, Wilcoxon signed-rank test); for decision
15, the mean order-up-level is 56.1 (significantly
below the optimal level of 68.8, p < 0.001, Wilcoxon
signed-rank test); and for decision 16, the mean order-
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Figure 6 Qualitative Prediction of Behavioral Model (assuming a = 0.5) for Treatments in Study 2
Table 2 Overview of Treatments in Study 2
Treatment # decisions
# Budget
cycles
# decisions
per cycle
T1 16 1 16 Baseline treatment
T2 16 8 2 Narrow frame
T3 16 4 4 Narrow frame
T4 16 8 2 Alternative narrow frame
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up-to level is 53.2 (not significantly different from the
optimal level of 50, p = 0.576, Wilcoxon signed-rank
test). There is no significant difference between
rounds 15 and 16 or between the average of rounds 1-
14 and round 15 or 16 (Wilcoxon signed-rank test,
p = 0.22 for subjects’ average order-up-to levels in 1–
14 vs. 15 and p = 0.52 for 1–14 vs. 16). Figure 7a shows
the development over the decisions. Although we are
interested mainly in the differences between the treat-
ments, we note that there is a strong pull-to-center
effect in the 16-decision newsvendor task. Addition-
ally, we find starting-inventory effects similar to those
in Study 1. Subjects increase the order-up-to level by
0.40 for each unit of starting inventory. Table 3 shows
the estimation results for the anchoring and starting-
inventory factors (see section 3.2.3 for details of the
estimation).
We now analyze the effect of the budget cycle
frame for T2. Comparing Figure 7a and b visual-
izes our first observation: Figure 7b shows a clear
cyclic order-up-to-level pattern for the two-period
budget cycle. The order-up-to level is significantly
lower in the second decisions of each year, with a
mean order-up-to level of 53.4 (dark-gray bars in
Figure 7b) compared to the first decisions (mean
= 60.4, light-gray bars, p < 0.001, Wilcoxon signed-
rank test). This also holds for each individual year
(p = 0.0697 for year 3, p = 0.051 for year 5, and
p ≤ 0.001 for all other years).
Figure 8a compares the average order-up-to level of
the first decisions per year for the first seven years
with the second decisions of these years (in those
years, the normative prediction was 71.4 for all deci-
sions). For these years, the first decisions were also
significantly higher than the second decisions (60.5
vs. 53.1, p < 0.001, Wilcoxon signed-rank test). Note
that for decisions 15 and 16 in year 8, there is a norma-
tive decline in the order-up-to level due to the end-of-
horizon effect. For the 16-decision case (T1), there is
no significant difference between the corresponding
(even and odd) periods. This shows that the narrow
frame on two decisions per year leads to short-sighted
decisions. We note again that this is not due to any
financial discounting (as in real-world settings) but
due only to the narrow focus.
Supporting this argument, Figures 7c and 8b show
the order-up-to levels for Treatment T3, with four
years with four decisions each. Figure 8b shows the
significant drop of the order-up-to levels in the fourth
decision per year (aggregated over the first three
years) from 56.5 to 49.4 (p ≤ 0.001). Compared to T2,
there is no drop for the second decisions. Figure 7c
also visualizes that the cyclic pattern (the drop at the
end of the year) is observable in each year (every four
decisions in T3). These results support our behavioral
short-sightedness model.
Analyzing the alternative narrow frame in T4, we
find qualitatively similar results between the two 892
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Figure 7 Mean Order-Up-To Levels in Treatments 1–4 of Study 2
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treatments (compare Figure 7b and d). The mean
order-up-to levels are again significantly lower for the
second decisions of a year compared to the first deci-
sions in a year in T4 (60.7 vs. 55.8, p ≤ 0.001, Wilcoxon
signed-rank test, see Figure 8a). Comparing T2 and
T4, we find no significant difference between order-
up-to levels in the first decisions in a year (two-sam-
ple Wilcoxon rank-sum test of subjects’ average
order-up-to level between treatments (NT2 ¼ 29,
NT4 ¼ 27), 60.5 vs. 60.7, p = 0.961), the second deci-
sions (53.1 vs. 55.8, p = 0.496) or the reduction of
order-up-to levels from first to second decisions (7.4
vs. 4.9, p = 0.248). We conclude that the effect is
robust and not simply based on our strong frame.
A second obvious observation is that order-up-to
levels are rather low, even in the first decisions. They
are significantly below the rational order-up-to level
(of 71.4) for the first 14 decisions for all of the treat-
ments (p < 0.001, Wilcoxon signed-rank test). This
observation is in line with previously observed mean
anchoring. In the previous experiment and in the last
decision, the optimal order-up-to level equaled mean
demand. Therefore, potential mean anchoring did not
bias subjects’ decisions there. For the first 15 decisions
in this experiment, the optimal order-up-to levels are
above mean demand. Therefore, mean anchoring
pulls order-up-to levels towards 50, which may
explain the observed differences from optimum, at
least for the first decisions per year. Note that mean
anchoring cannot explain the cyclic pattern in the
order quantities: optimal order-up-to levels are the
same for SN and SN1 in the first seven years; there-
fore, mean anchoring leads to similar order-up-to
levels throughout the first 14 decisions (independent
of the frame).
A third observation is that the mean order-up-to
level is not (significantly) above optimum for the very
last decision. However, there is a straightforward rea-
son for this: the demand realization in the second last
period was very low (d15 ¼ 6). This resulted in a very
high starting inventory for decision 16. On average,
the starting inventory was 53.59, which was already
Table 3 Estimation Results of Behavioral Parameters for Treatments in Study 2
Parameter T1 (1916) T2 (892) T3 (494) T4 (892 LIGHT)
Anchoring (h) 0.785*** 0.477*** 0.757*** 0.485***
(0.112) (0.132) (0.076) (0.112)
Starting inventory (b0) 0.402*** 0.106*** 0.140 0.176***
(0.114) (0.022) (0.1032) (0.036)
Short-sightedness (a) 0.625** 0.670** 0.656**
(0.179) (0.151) (0.178)
N 416 418 403 411
# of clusters 28 29 28 27
LogLike 1626.82 1524.45 1473.39 1519.48
Note: Significant values against normative benchmarks (h = 0, a = 1, b0 ¼ 0) in bold, standard errors of estimates in parentheses. ***:p < 0.01,
**:p < 0.05, *: p < 0.1.
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Figure 8 Aggregated Orders for Treatments 1–4 of Study 2
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above the optimal order-up-to level of 50. In that deci-
sion, only 9 out of 29 subjects placed an order quantity
> 0. This shows that the actual targeted order-up-to
level is probably below the observed 55.8. Such effect
can occur if the targeted order-up-to levels decrease
over time/decisions and demand realizations are
very low.
Combining these factors, we now estimate the
behavioral parameters and the effect of these factors.
3.2.3 Estimating Behavioral Parameters. To esti-
mate the behavioral model, we consider three
behavioral parameters: the anchor factor h, the start-
ing-inventory factor b, and the short-sightedness fac-
tor a. Anchoring on mean demand is classically
modeled using the anchor factor h:
Si ¼ hlþ ð1 hÞSi ; ð8Þ
where Si is the optimal order-up-to level for period
i. From a normative perspective, we expect no
anchoring and therefore h = 0.
We discussed the starting-inventory effect in Study
1 in the single-period model. For the multiperiod
model, we use a simple estimation approach:
Si ¼ Si þ b0ISTART; ð9Þ
where b0 represents the fraction of starting inventory
that subjects do not deduct from their targeted
order-up-to level when determining the order quan-
tity (i.e., their starting inventory over-weighting, see
also Equation (7)). From a normative perspective,
we expect no starting-inventory effect and therefore
b0 ¼ 0.
To test the short-sightedness effect, we first have to
analyze how a affects the order-up-to levels over the
16 decisions. We denote the number of decisions
within a budget cycle as N (the number of budget
cycles is denoted as J). As described in section 2.3,
there is no closed-form solution for the behavioral
order-up-to level Sat . To enable an effective estimation,
we need to find a closed-form approximation for Sat .
To do so, we analyze the numerical results in more
detail. Recall Figure 3 and the effect of a on the order-
up-to levels. Certain observations are important for
the further analysis:
1. The order-up-to levels in the last budget cycle
(J) are equivalent to the N-period model
(SJN ¼ S ¼ 50 and SJN1 ¼ 68:8).
2. There is a cyclic pattern for the earlier budget
cycles (j < J) with SN1 SN  S (for a ≤ 1).
3. SN is the same across earlier budget cycles
(j < J) but larger than in the last budget cycle
(S
j¼ 1
N ¼ Sj¼2N ¼ . . . ¼ SJ1N  SJN ¼ S ¼ 50).
4. Equivalent relations hold for the comparisons
of the second last decisions SN1 between bud-
get cycles.
5. Earlier decisions in the budget cycles
(SN2; SN3) are the same within and across all
budget cycles. Additionally, they are not
affected by short-sightedness. In our setting,
SN2 ¼ SN3 ¼ 71:4.
Based on these observations, we optimize the
order-up-to level for the two last decisions
(SN; SN1) within earlier budget cycles (j < J) for
different a numerically. The results are shown in
Figure 9. We observe that the order-up-to level
decreases for decreasing a (i.e., increasing short-
sightedness). In the extreme case of a = 0, order-
up-to levels equal those of the two-period model
(SN1 ¼ 68:8 for the second last decisions and
SN ¼ S ¼ 50 for the last decisions in a budget
cycle). For rational decision makers (a = 1), the
order-up-to levels are the same for both decisions
(i.e., SN1 ¼ SN ¼ 71:4 for our setting).
For budget cycles with more than two periods
(e.g., N = 4), the order-up-to levels for the third
last and earlier periods (SN2; SN3; . . .) are not
effected by a (see Figure 3). To make the follow-
ing estimations trackable, we use polynomial
approximations of the relationships for (SaN; S
a
N1),
as shown in Figure 9. The graphs show that a
polynomial provides a very good approximation
of the relevant range (0 ≤ a ≤ 1) for the short-
sighted order-up-to level:
eSaN1 ¼ 1:8881a2 þ 4:5608aþ 68:78; ð10Þ
eSaN ¼ 7:2844a2 þ 13:979aþ 50:034: ð11Þ
Combining the three behavioral factors, the
expected behavioral order-up-to level (S) for any
period is
S ¼ hlþ ð1 hÞ Sat þ b0ISTART
 
; ð12Þ
with the optimal behavioral order-up-to level
depending on the period.
For the treatments with two decisions per budget
cycle (T2 and T4):
Sat ¼
eSaN1; for t ¼ 1; 3; 5; 7; 9; 11; 13eSaN; for t ¼ 2; 4; 6; 8; 10; 12; 14
S2; for t ¼ 15
S1 for t ¼ 16:
8><>: ð13Þ
For treatments with four decisions per budget cycle
(T3), the optimal order-up-to level for the decision
SN2 and SN3 is equal to 71.4 (see Figure 6). This
results in the following equation:
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Sat ¼
71:4; for t ¼ 1; 2; 5; 6; 9; 10; 13; 14eSaN1; for t ¼ 3; 7; 11eSaN; for t ¼ 4; 8; 12
S2; for t ¼ 15
S1 for t ¼ 16:
8>><>>>: ð14Þ
To estimate the effects for our experimental data,
we use a nonlinear random-coefficient model, cluster-
ing on subject level. We consider only decisions in
which subjects actually placed an order (with a posi-
tive order quantity), because for the other decisions,
we cannot precisely determine the targeted order-up-
to level. Table 3 shows the results of our estimation
for the different treatments. We find significant and
strong effects for all three behavioral factors in all the
treatments.4
Anchoring. First, subjects anchor on mean demand
when deciding on the order-up-to level with a weight
on the mean demand (h). Anchoring is strongest in T1
(0.785) and smallest in T2 (0.477). This is unsurprising
if we consider that T1 consists of a task in which sub-
jects have 16 decisions on one screen. In T3, there are
4 decisions “at once” and in T2, only two decisions.
T4 lies in-between, because subjects have 16 decisions
on the screen but focus instead on the budget cycle
with two decisions. Therefore, we expect the task in
T1 to be perceived as more complex, leading to a
higher degree of anchoring.
Starting inventory. Second, subjects do not fully
account for starting inventory but decrease their
order-up-to level only by 1 b0 ¼ 59:8% of the start-
ing inventory in T1. This estimate is bigger in T1 than
in the other treatments. Whereas subjects rationally
account for starting inventory in T3 (the estimate is
not significantly different from 0), they slightly over-
order (by 10.6% and 17.6%) in treatments T2 and T4.
Short-sightedness. Finally, subjects exhibit short-
sightedness and do not fully account for the effects on
the cash flows in the following budget cycles for
treatments T2-T4. The estimates of the short-sighted-
ness factor (a) are significantly smaller than the nor-
mative value of 1 for T2 (a = 0.625, p = 0.018). The
light frame in T4 weakens that effect slightly
(a = 0.656), but it remains significantly smaller than 1
(p = 0.027). This shows that even under the milder
frame in T4, subjects are narrow bracketing and do
not account correctly for the future periods, which is
in line with the prediction of our behavioral model
(Corollary 1). In T3 (with four decisions per year),
short-sightedness is decreased even further
(a = 0.670) but remains significantly below 1
(p = 0.014). We note that the full models shown in
Table 3 perform significantly better than partial mod-
els with fewer parameters (see tables 4–6 in the
Appendix for the full comparison).
Summarizing the findings of our experiments, we
find non-expected-profit-maximizing ordering
behavior. Order-up-to levels differ significantly
from the optimum for most of the periods. The dif-
ferences in relation to normative theory can be
attributed to three different factors. First, we
observe anchoring on mean demand. Although this
effect has been observed in previous studies, it is
noteworthy that the size of the effect is rather high
in our setting. Other studies have reported values
between 0.20 and 0.79 in the single-period newsven-
dor setting (Becker-Peth and Thonemann 2018). This
rather high value may be driven by the higher com-
plexity in our setting. Higher complexity of decision
tasks increases the use of decision heuristics, and a
multiperiod decision setting is naturally more com-
plex than a single-period setting.
Additionally, we observe that decision makers do
not fully account for starting inventory. Subjects do
not order up to the same inventory level when facing
different starting inventories (both with exogenous
starting inventory and endogenous starting inventory
resulting from previous decisions). This is an
y = 7.2844 x2 + 13.979 x + 50.034
R² = 0.9999
Last decision order-up-to level
y = -1.8881 x2 + 4.5608 x + 68.78
R² = 0.998
Second last decision order-up-to level
Figure 9 Increasing Factor of Order-Up-To Level in the Years before the Last Year (j < J) for Different Levels of Short-Sightedness
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interesting finding that has not been explicitly
reported in previous studies.
The most interesting finding is that subjects are
very short-sighted and do not properly consider the
long-term effect of their decision. In our multiperiod
setting, subjects’ ordering is similar to that of the sin-
gle-year setting, and they do not order enough units,
especially in the last periods of the year. This cyclic
pattern relates to an under-weighting of future years
and periods (aT2 ¼ 0:496 and aT4 ¼ 0:558 instead of
1). Generally, loss aversion would reduce the order-
up-to levels similarly between periods (mixing with
mean anchoring in our setting); therefore, loss aver-
sion cannot explain this pattern. We observe this
effect even in a setting where there are no rational rea-
sons for decreasing the weight of later decisions, e.g.,
discounting later payments due to interest rates. This
effect has not previously been reported in inventory
settings.
4. Conclusion
In this study, we analyze inventory decisions in multi-
period settings under a cash flow incentive. We focus
on the setting in which decision makers make multi-
ple decisions over time with inventory carryover
between decisions. Our paper offers two main contri-
butions.
First, we find that starting inventory is not fully
considered in the ordering decisions of human deci-
sion makers. Interestingly, starting inventory has a
significant effect on the order-up-to level. Although
optimal order-up-to levels are the same, higher start-
ing inventory leads to higher actual order-up-to
levels (our estimates indicate an increase of approxi-
mately 30% of the starting inventory). One explana-
tion for this may be an under-weighting of existing
inventory comparable to the under-weighting of
pipeline inventory in the beer game (Croson and
Donohue 2006, Sterman 1989). In our experiments,
human decision makers order products even when
the starting inventory is above the optimal order-up-
to level. This may also indicate an action bias
whereby human decision makers place an order
despite not needing to order any goods (e.g., Bar-El
et al. 2007). This effect suggests that it is important
to explicitly test the difference between a setting
with order-up-to levels as a decision variable and a
setting with order quantities, and we leave this for
future research.
Second, we review the impact of budget cycles
in a multiperiod setting. First, we (analytically)
show that a finite incentive system, e.g., due to job
rotation or fixed-term contracts, leads to a decrease
of order-up-to levels towards the end of the incen-
tive system. At the beginning of the time horizon,
order-up-to levels are constantly on a higher level
compared to the end period. The order-up-to levels
decrease in the last two periods of the incentive
horizon. Second, we show that the short-sighted-
ness of decision makers (e.g., a focus on a budget
cycle) has a detrimental effect if budget cycles are
used for intermediate incentive payments. Decision
makers decrease the order-up-to level towards the
end of each budget year and do not account for
spillovers into future budget cycles. This leads to a
cyclic ordering pattern over the budget cycles. Con-
ducting lab experiments, we find evidence that
subjects are short-sighted, focusing on the budget
year even in settings in which it is not rational to
discount future periods. Testing different lengths of
budget cycles and different frames, we find a sig-
nificant decrease of order-up-to levels at the end of
the budget cycles even in early periods of the
incentive horizon (where there should not be a
decrease). This ordering pattern is in line with nar-
row bracketing, which is known to be relevant in
other contexts, e.g., financial decision-making.
Focusing too much on the actual budget cycle,
decision makers under-weight the impact of the
decision on future budget cycles. In the extreme
case, decision makers may act as if the incentive
horizon ends after the current budget cycle, reduc-
ing the order-up-to levels to single-period levels at
the end of the budget cycle.
Narrow bracketing is usually described as having
a negative impact on overall performance (because
subjects ignore important effects). However, our
experiments show an interesting behavioral effect:
narrowing the frame can also improve the perfor-
mance of decision makers. To demonstrate this phe-
nomenon, we calculated the expected profits for the
different treatments for the observed ordering pat-
terns.5 We find that expected profits are lowest for
the 1916 Treatment (T1) and highest for the 892
treatment (T4) (the difference is weakly significant,
p = 0.064). Facing all 16 decisions on one screen, sub-
jects exhibit a stronger pull-to-center effect, because
the perceived complexity may be higher. Moreover,
the variance of the order-up-to levels is higher in T1
than in T4 (320 in T1 vs. 240 in T4 and vs. only 159
in T3). Focusing on the current budget cycle, deci-
sion makers can solve the task more easily but suffer
from the narrow structural frame, leading to an over-
all improvement for our setting. Analyzing this,
there may be an optimal frame that balances the nec-
essary focus and the long-term horizon. This is an
interesting topic which could be addressed in future
research.
This also raises the question of whether and how
much the problem should be simplified to obtain
the best performance. Simplifying the problem
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leads to worse normative solutions, but human
decision makers may be able to find the best solu-
tion for this task. This could lead to better overall
performances than humans trying (failing) to solve
the complex problem and ending up with a worse
solution.
In our experimental study, the implemented budget
cycles had no effect on normative decision-making.
There was no incremental incentive on lower year-
end inventories (all inventories were accounted), no
real time lag between payments (all payments were
done at the end of the session), and no additional ben-
efits for reduced final inventories (e.g. signaling effi-
ciency to the stock market). Such factors are likely to
additionally affect real-world decision makers and
lead to an even stronger end-of-budget-cycle effect.
However, our experiments show that in addition to
these factors, the design of incentives and decision-
support tools can have a significant effect. Our experi-
mental design relates to the question of how to design
decision-support tools, because they may also induce
such a narrow frame.
These observations have important implications in
terms of our contribution to the emerging field of
research on the inverse hockey-stick effect of invento-
ries. Empirical research (Hoberg et al. 2017, Lai and
Xiao 2017) has shown that inventory levels decrease
significantly toward the end of the fiscal year. Our
paper identifies additional factors that may cause
such an effect. Decreased order-up-to levels directly
correspond to reduced expected ending inventories
(given constant demand distributions). This means
that short-sighted decision makers intentionally
decrease the inventory level towards the end of their
individual planning horizons. This is the case for a
setting in which no discounting of future returns
applies. However, in reality, managers may very well
discount future bonus payments, especially if it is
uncertain that they will keep their position and
responsibilities in the future. Accordingly, short-
sightedness and myopic behavior may apply more
strongly in real-world situations than in our stylized
laboratory setting.
These results have implications for future
research in behavioral operations management. Pre-
vious studies have focused on settings without
inventory carryover and no starting inventory. In
such settings, order-up-to levels are identical to
order quantities. However, our results show that
both inventory carryover and starting inventory
drive the complexity of decisions and affect the
ordering behavior of human decision makers. Fur-
ther, future research could review the cyclic order-
ing pattern in more detail. In our analysis, we
found significant differences between the ordering
decisions in the two periods of the budget cycle.
However, in real life, there are likely more than
two periods and two order decisions in a budget
cycle (e.g., many retailers can place orders every
day). For accounting purposes, many firms regard
performance metrics as incentives that are gathered
on a quarterly or monthly basis. Accordingly, it
would be interesting for future research to investi-
gate how inventory managers react in settings with
more than two periods. We expect that the cyclic
pattern would be more pronounced with higher
reductions towards the end of the budget cycle but
also initial peaks at the start of the budget cycle.
However, we leave this analysis to future research.
Our research also provides managerial insights.
We find that short-sighted human behavior leads to
higher order and inventory variability. This may
cause problems within the supply chain, such as the
bullwhip effect. In the theoretical case of an infinite
planning horizon, the order-up-to levels are also con-
stant. However, incentives in real-world settings can-
not be infinite. Additionally, human decision makers
heavily discount future income, which leads to
short-sighted decision-making. In this study, we
assumed the same demand distributions for both
periods. However, demand in reality often fluctuates
throughout the planning horizon. Seasonal demand
can be particularly high on certain days of the week
or in certain months of the year. Inventory planners
need to manage inventories accordingly and dynam-
ically adjust them throughout the planning horizon.
It is important for future research to shed light on
the behavioral aspects of changing demand.
Appendix A. Proofs
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1. If we consider the last bud-
get cycle, it is as if we consider a two-period model.
The expected objective function in this case is
max
S1;S2
E CFðS1; S2Þ½  ¼ max
S1;S2
"
r
Z 1
x1þq1
ðx1 þ q1Þfðn1Þdn1
þ r
Z x1þq1
0
n1f n1ð Þdn1  cq1
 h
Z x1þq1
0
ðx1 þ q1  n1Þf n1ð Þdn1
þ r
Z 1
x2þq2
ðx2 þ q2Þfðn2Þdn2
þ r
Z x2þq2
0
n2f n2ð Þdn2  cq2
 h
Z x2þq2
0
ðx2 þ q2  n2Þf n2ð Þdn2

;
ðA:1Þ
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where x1 ¼ 0, x2 ¼ ð0; x1 þ q1  n1Þþ, q1 ¼ ð0;
S1  x1Þþ, and q2 ¼ ð0; S2  x2Þþ. The expected
objective function can be written as
max
S1 ;S2
E CFðS1;S2Þ½ ¼max
S1 ;S2
"
r
Z S1
n1¼0
n1f n1ð Þdn1 þ rS1 1FðS1Þð ÞcS1
 h
Z S1
n1¼0
ðS1n1Þf n1ð Þdn1
þ r
Z S1
n1¼ðS1S2Þþ
Z S2
n2¼0
n2fðn1Þfðn2Þdn2dn1
þ r
Z S1
n1¼ðS1S2Þþ
Z 1
n2¼S2
S2fðn1Þfðn2Þdn2dn1
þ r
Z ðS1S2Þþ
n1¼0
Z S1n1
n2¼0
n2fðn1Þfðn2Þdn2dn1
þ r
Z ðS1S2Þþ
n1¼0
Z 1
n2¼S1n1
ðS1n1Þfðn1Þfðn2Þdn2dn1
þ r
Z 1
n1¼S1
Z S2
n2¼0
n2fðn1Þfðn2Þdn2dn1
þ r
Z 1
n1¼S1
Z 1
n2¼S2
S2fðn1Þfðn2Þdn2dn1
 c
Z S1
n1¼ðS1S2Þþ
ðS2S1þn1Þfðn1Þdn1
 c
Z 1
S1
S2fðn1Þdn1
 h
Z S1
n1¼ðS1S2Þþ
Z S2
n2¼0
ðS2n2Þfðn1Þfðn2Þdn2dn1
 h
Z ðS1S2Þþ
n1¼0
Z S1n1
n2¼0
ðS1n1n2Þfðn1Þfðn2Þdn2dn1
 h
Z 1
n1¼S1
Z S2
n2¼0
ðS2n2Þfðn1Þfðn2Þdn2dn1

:
ðA:2Þ
After rearranging the integrals using the properties
of the probability distribution functions, we get
the following (note that the ∞ symbols are
replaced):
max
S1 ;S2
E CFðS1;S2Þ½ ¼max
S1;S2
"
r
Z S1
n1¼0
n1f n1ð Þdn1þ rS1 1FðS1Þð ÞcS1
 h
Z S1
n1¼0
ðS1n1Þf n1ð Þdn1
þ r
Z S1
n1¼ðS1S2Þþ
Z S2
n2¼0
n2fðn1Þfðn2Þdn2dn1
þ r½1FðS2ÞS2
Z S1
n1¼ðS1S2Þþ
fðn1Þdn1
þ r
Z ðS1S2Þþ
n1¼0
Z S1n1
n2¼0
n2fðn1Þfðn2Þdn2dn1
þ r
Z ðS1S2Þþ
n1¼0
ðS1n1Þ½1FðS1n1Þfðn1Þdn1
þr½1FðS1Þ
Z S2
n2¼0
n2fðn2Þdn2
þ rS2½1FðS2Þ½1FðS1Þ
 c
Z S1
n1¼ðS1S2Þþ
ðS2S1þn1Þfðn1Þdn1
 cS2þ cS2FðS1Þ
 h
Z S1
n1¼ðS1S2Þþ
Z S2
n2¼0
ðS2n2Þfðn1Þfðn2Þdn2dn1
 h
Z ðS1S2Þþ
n1¼0
Z S1n1
n2¼0
ðS1n1n2Þfðn1Þfðn2Þdn2dn1
 h½1FðS1Þ
Z S2
n2¼0
ðS2n2Þfðn2Þdn2

:
If demand in both periods follows a continuous uni-
form distribution U[0,1], then this expression
becomes
max
S1 ;S2
E CFðS1;S2Þ½  ¼max
S1;S2
r
Z S1
n1¼0
n1dn1þ rS1 rS21 cS1

 h
Z S1
n1¼0
ðS1n1Þdn1
þ r
Z S1
n1¼ðS1S2Þþ
Z S2
n2¼0
n2dn2dn1
þ r½1S2S2
Z S1
n1¼ðS1S2Þþ
dn1
þ r
Z ðS1S2Þþ
n1¼0
Z S1n1
n2¼0
n2dn2dn1
þ r
Z ðS1S2Þþ
n1¼0
ðS1n1Þ½1S1þn1dn1
þ r½1S1
Z S2
n2¼0
n2dn2
þ rS2½1S2½1S1
 c
Z S1
n1¼ðS1S2Þþ
ðS2S1þn1Þdn1
 cS2þ cS2S1
 h
Z S1
n1¼ðS1S2Þþ
Z S2
n2¼0
ðS2n2Þdn2dn1
 h
Z ðS1S2Þþ
n1¼0
Z S1n1
n2¼0
ðS1n1n2Þdn2dn1
 h½1S1
Z S2
n2¼0
ðS2n2Þdn2

:
ðA:4Þ
The first derivative with respect to S1 is  rS222
þ hS222  c

2S22S1
2 þ 2S12S22
  rð1  S2ÞS2 þ cS2 þ rS122
 hS122 þ rð6S16S1
2Þ
6  rS1  hS1 þ r  c:
The first derivative with respect to S2 is
rð6S226S2Þ
6 hS22c

2S22S1
2 þS1
þ2rð1S2ÞS2hð1S1Þ
S2þrð1S1Þð1S2ÞþcS1c:
Solving the first- and second-order conditions, we
get the only feasible set of solutions
S1 ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
r2þ2hrþh22chc2
p
h
rþh and S

2 ¼ rcrþh, where the
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second-order conditions satisfy the conditions for a
maximum.
Proof by contradiction: We assume that S1\ S

2 ,ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
r2þ2hrþh22chc2
p
h
rþh \
rc
rþh ,
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
r2 þ 2hr þ h2  2ch  c2
p
\ hþ r c, r2 þ 2hrþ h2  2ch c2\ h2 þ 2hðr cÞ
þ ðr cÞ2 , c r [ 0, c [ r, which does not hold.
Therefore, we can conclude that S1S2. h
PROOF OF COROLLARY 1. For notational reasons, let us
assume that the multiperiod model has N periods,
with N denoting the last period. It can be easily
shown that the last two periods of the multiperiod
model N1 and N are equivalent to the first and
second periods of our previous two-period model.
This is because when we are entering period N1,
we have only two periods ahead of us; after that,
we reach the end of the time horizon for the
dynamic programming model. So the last two peri-
ods of the multiperiod model correspond to the
two-period model. The only difference between the
last two periods of the multiperiod model and the
two-period model is that at the beginning of period
N1, there could be initial inventory carried over
from period N2. Because our model is an order-
up-to level model, having initial inventory at the
beginning of period N1 (e.g., remaining inventory
from previous periods) does not change the optimal
order-up-to levels SN1 and S

N . The only thing that
would change is the order quantity, not the order-
up-to levels. Thus, we can conclude that the optimal
order-up-to level for period N1 of the multiperiod
model is equal to that of the first period
SN1 ¼ S1 ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
r2þ2hrþh22chc2
p
h
rþh . Similarly, the opti-
mal order-up-to level for period N of the multi-
period model is SN ¼ S2 ¼ rcrþh. As shown in the
previous proof, if we assume that S1\S

2 ,ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
r2þ2hrþh22chc2
p
h
rþh \
rc
rþh ,
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
r2 þ 2hrp þh2  2ch c2
\hþ r c, r2 þ 2hrþ h2  2ch c2\h2 þ 2hðr cÞ
þ ðr cÞ2 , c r [ 0, c[ r does not hold. Hence,
we have proved by contradiction that S1S2.
Table 4 Comparison of Estimations for T2 (robust standard errors clustered on subject level in parentheses)
T2 Full (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
h 0.477 0.649 0 0 0.657 0.457 0
(0.132) (0.123) (0.122) (0.137)
b 0.106 0 0.404 0 0.185 0 0.028
(0.022) (0.091) (0.031) (0.041)
a 0.625 1 1 0.109 1 0.657 0.116
(0.179) (0.173) (0.171) (0.160)
N 418 418 418 418 418 418 418
# clusters 29 29 29 29 29 29 29
LL 1524 1578 1854 1705 1573 1530 1697
AIC 3068 3163 3714 3417 3158 3073 3407
Table 5 Comparison of Estimations for T3 (robust standard errors clustered on subject level in parentheses)
T3 Full (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
h 0.757 0.780 0 0 0.797 0.742 0
(0.084) (0.077) (0.078) (0.084)
b 0.140 0 0.474 0 0.130 0 0.361
(0.103) (0.078) (0.146) (0.073)
a 0.670 1 1 0.283 1 0.742 0.046
(0.143) (0.134) (0.141) (0.140)
N 403 403 403 403 403 403 403
# clusters 28 28 28 28 28 28 28
LL 1473 1497 1760 1742 1486 1486 1724
AIC 2967 3000 3526 3491 2984 2984 3460
Appendix B. Additional Analyses
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Notes
1In reality, the bonus may also be based on the inventory
position at the end of the year. In fact, such an incentive
will even increase the effect we observe, a phenomenon
we discuss at the end of the paper.
2For completeness, we note that we also conducted an
additional treatment with a different incentive system
(Accounting Profit). The results are comparable to the
treatment here, and we exclude that incentive system from
the paper to improve readability.
3The subjects additionally played eight single-period deci-
sions without starting inventory upfront to become famil-
iar with the setting, but for the sake of readability, we
exclude the results from the paper.
4As a robustness check, we estimated the parameters
when including zero orders. The results, which exhibit
only negligible changes, are included in table 7 in the
Appendix. For these cases (where starting inventory is
rather high), we overestimate the effect of starting
inventory, because the order-up-to level is an upper
bound for the targeted value. Additionally, we underes-
timate the short-sightedness effect, because these cases
occur more often in the periods where you aim at
lower order-up-to levels. However, the factors are still
significantly different from 1.
5We simulated 1,000,000 samples of 16 demand realiza-
tions and calculated the profits for the subjects’ order-up-
to levels observed in the lab.
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